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Abstract
Path-dependence oers a promising way of understanding the role his-
toricity plays in explanation, namely, how the past states of a process
can matter in the explanation of a given outcome. The two main ex-
isting accounts of path-dependence have sought to present it either
in terms of dynamic landscapes or branching trees. However, the no-
tions of landscape and tree both have serious limitations and have
been criticized. The framework of causal networks is both more fun-
damental and more general that that of landscapes and trees. Within
this framework, I propose that historicity in networks should be un-
derstood as symmetry breaking. History matters when an asymmetric
bias towards an outcome emerges in a causal network. This permits a
quantitative measure for how path-dependence can occur in degrees,
and oers suggestive insights into how historicity is intertwined both
with causal structure and complexity.
Keywords: Path-dependence - explanation - historicity - symmetry -
causal networks - mutual information
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Introduction
In many complex systems the past matters in explaining which outcome
eventually obtains. This gives many processes in the special sciences, from
chemical reactions to the evolution of political institutions, a seemingly ir-
reducible historical character. The adoption of the QWERTY keyboard is
often taken as a paradigm case of this phenomenon (David 1985). Orig-
inally, the QWERTY layout was designed in order to prevent typewriters
from jamming; however, it subsequently became entrenched, even though
the typewriter itself became obsolete, and even though there are more e-
cient ways of organizing an English-language keyboard for a computer. Thus,
to explain why the present state of keyboards is as it is, one needs to integrate
information about past states.
Perhaps the most prominent analysis of historicity has been in terms
of path-dependence. In the broadest sense, path-dependence merely implies
that the path followed by a system is explanatorily relevant for its nal
outcome. In this sense, the term is simply another way of saying `past states
matter'. However, once this `explanatory relevance' is given a more precise
characterization, narrower and more technical accounts of path-dependence
emerge. Such accounts were originally proposed in economics and the social
sciences (Arthur 1994, Pierson 2004), but more recently the issue has been
receiving increasing attention from philosophers of science (Szathmary 2006;
Ereshevsky 2012; Desjardins 2011a, 2011b, 2015).
In the philosophy of science literature, the notion of path-dependence is
closely related to two other ways of understanding historicity: `sensitivity
to initial conditions' (Ben-Yenahem 1997, Powell 2012) and `contingency'
(Beatty 2006, Desjardins and Beatty 2009). In this paper, these approaches
will be integrated into the account of path-dependence (as also done by Des-
jardins 2011a) and therefore will not be explicitly discussed. After all, path-
dependence in the broad sense is more or less synonymous with historicity to
begin with, so these other approaches are best not seen as rival approaches,
but as highlighting dierent aspects of path-dependence.
Among the more technical accounts of path-dependence, two classes of
model can be discerned. The rst characterizes path-dependence as occur-
ring when a system could possibly evolve towards one of multiple local stable
equilibria or attractor states (e.g. Bassanini and Dosi 1999, Pierson 2004,
Szathmary 2006). In this way certain key aspects of path-dependence, such
as nonlinearity and sensitivity to initial conditions, can be modeled as an evo-
lution on what I call an attractor landscape with multiple attractor states.
Such a model, like the adaptive landscape metaphor in evolutionary biol-
ogy, has serious limitations, the main one being that in systems with high
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dimensionality the topology of associated landscapes tend to be ridged and
holey. As we will see, this means that the dynamics of such systems cannot
be modeled as simply maximizing some scalar variable, and this precludes a
general formulation of path-dependence in terms of landscape topology (see
Gavrilets 2004, Kaplan 2008).
The second broad class of model has represented path-dependent pro-
cesses as a branching causal tree (Desjardins 2011a). However, branching
trees also have limitations when the causal structure becomes too complex,
in particular when there are multiple possible initial states, or when there
is a signicant number of non-tree events, or `reticulations', where branches
converge (Moret et al. 2004). For example, an area where the tree metaphor
has received signicant criticism is phylogenetics, where phenomena such as
hybrid speciation or lateral gene transfer cannot be captured in tree models.
To address these limitations, the rst purpose of this paper is to intro-
duce the notion of causal networks in some formal detail, and show how they
are generalizations of both landscapes and branching trees. Network mod-
els are already well established in the causal modeling literature (following
Pearl 2000) and in phylogenetics (e.g. Moret et al. 2004, Velasco and Sober
2010), but in the literature on path-dependence they have been underutilized.
Causal networks allow complex causal relations to be represented when both
tree or landscape metaphors fail.
The second, and main, purpose of the paper is to formulate a criterion
of path-dependence that ts naturally within a causal-network framework.
Borrowing from the notion of symmetry in physics, where it is used to charac-
terize spatial congurations or dynamical equations, I will propose to extend
the application of the notion of symmetry to the space of possible causal
paths. The basic idea is that in ahistorical explanation there is a symmetry
(interchangeability) between the biases towards the explanandum among all
possible states at any given time. Path-dependence arises in a causal network
when some past state has a dierent probabilistic bias towards the explanan-
dum than the other contemporaneous past states | or in other words, when
the symmetry is broken. Thus symmetry is potentially a powerful tool to
characterize the path-dependence of a process without unnecessarily simpli-
fying its causal structure to t the mould of either a tree or a landscape.
In a nal section I will outline how path-dependence can be quantied,
as one unresolved challenge remaining is how precisely some processes can
be `more' path-dependent than others. I propose adopting the measure
of `mutual information', which is an information-theoretic concept used to
quantify the amount of information one variable contributes about another.
This measure is conceptually continuous with the symmetry formulation of
path-dependence, and suggests one way in which the properties of path-
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dependence can be studied formally.
I. Aspects of Path Dependence
In this rst section I begin by selecting some salient properties of path-
dependent explanations of processes1 in order to develop some intuitions
concerning the phenomenon. I will loosely group these properties according
to whether they are future-oriented or past-oriented.
Among the past-oriented aspects, a key distinction is that between infor-
mation-preserving and information-destroying processes (Sober 1983, 1988;
Desjardins 2011). The latter is exemplied by what happens when a marble is
released from the rim of a bowl: the marble will roll down and rock back and
forth until it comes to a stop in the middle of the bowl. Given information
about the nal state alone, it is impossible to reconstruct its initial state,
since no matter where precisely on the rim the marble was released, it would
invariably have come to rest at the middle point. This is an example of path-
independence, as the precise path followed by the marble makes no dierence
to the nal state. In other words, the past of the marble is `erased' and does
not matter for the explanandum.
One of the most basic path-dependent processes is movement with fric-
tion. If one slides a block of wood from point A to point B, then it matters
whether the shortest path between the points is chosen, or some more in-
direct route. In the latter case, more heat will be generated due to friction
between the block of wood and the surface. Thus, some information about
the past (i.e. the length of the path followed, or the speed with which the
block was pushed) is preserved in the nal state.
In general, most real processes have both information-preserving and
information-destroying aspects, and in this way can only be said to be par-
tially path-dependent. For example, the morphology of the whale shows
remarkable similarities with the morphology of sh, yet there are signicant
dierences as well. Some information about the past is destroyed due to the
convergent evolution towards the streamlined morphology. However, a whale
has lungs instead of gills, and its ns are exapted from ngers, and thus some
information about its land-based past is preserved.
A second group of properties of path-dependence concerns how the past
makes a counterfactual dierence for the present: if the past were dier-
1In this paper, I take path-dependence to be a property of an explanation or a repre-
sentation of a process, not a property of the process itself. A process is not identical with
the representation of it, and epistemological problems arise because of this disjunction;
however, this will not be a concern for the purposes of this paper. In interests of brevity,
I will often refer to representations of processes simply as `processes'.
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ent, the outcome would also be dierent. For example, if humanity had
skipped the technology of typewriters, and gone straight to computers, there
would likely be no QWERTY keyboard. The phenomenon of sensitivity to
initial conditions | how a small change in initial conditions can lead to a
large change in outcomes | concerns this aspect of path-dependence (Ben-
Yenahem 1997, Powell 2012). An example is the nonlinearity of the weather,
so that, so to speak, a buttery can ap its wings in Paris and cause a storm
in New York. The outcome could not have occurred if the past were dierent.
The underlying notion here is the contingency of the explanandum, where
`contingency' refers not to the modal structure of the explanandum (i.e.
whether or not it is true in all possible worlds), but to the structure of its
causal history. The outcome is contingent if, given what we know about its
causal antecedents, it could not have occurred.2
A helpful distinction here lies between causal-dependence contingency and
unpredictability contingency (Beatty 2006). Causal-dependence contingency
refers to the counterfactual dependence of the outcome on some prior state.
Thus A is `contingent upon' B if and only if, were B not present, A would
not obtain. Causal-dependence contingency is thus a very broad notion,
and also covers deterministic processes where there is dependence on initial
conditions, such as the Newtonian dynamics of individual particles.
Unpredictability contingency refers more specically to indeterminism in
a process, or at least, a modeled indeterminism in the explanatory structure.3
It is insucient to know the prior states in order to predict the outcome state.
Beatty describes this as `contingency per se' (2006, 38-40), thus indicating
that contingency can also be used as a one-place predicate attaching to an
explanandum (Beatty 2006, 38-40).
These two notions of contingency capture two dierent senses in which the
outcome could not have occurred, given the initial state. Unpredictability
contingency is not necessary for path-dependence, as some perfectly pre-
dictable processes (e.g. Newtonian dynamics) depend on initial conditions,
and thus the outcome is dependent on which causal path had been taken.4
This has led some to refer to dependence on initial conditions as `weak' path-
dependence, and the cases where the process depends on multiple past states
2This is partially why historical explanations do not t the mould of deductive (or even
inductive) explanations. The explanandum cannot be deduced from a general principle,
or inductively inferred with high probability, but maintains some degree of `contingency'.
3Many processes in statistical physics and the special sciences are modelled as prob-
abilistic, even though the underlying causal processes may be deterministic. See also
footnote 1.
4We will see later on that unpredictability contingency is not sucient either: some
probabilistic processes are ahistorical.
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as `strong' path-dependence (Ereshevsky 2012).
These two orientations, future-directed and past-directed, are in no way
mutually exclusive, and most real examples involve both perspectives. Con-
sider the phenomenon of positive feedback, where the system is initially bal-
anced between two basins of separate attractors, and where any initial uc-
tuation will snowball and result in a large, self-reinforcing change. A clas-
sic example of this is the emergence of the VCR videocassette technology
(Arthur 1994). Initially, the videocassette market was precariously poised
between two competing technologies, VCR and Beta; however, a slightly
greater adoption of the VCR technology by consumers led to it becoming
more widely available in video outlets, in turn precipitating further adoption
by consumers. Thus VCR came to dominate the market. In this example,
there is unpredictability contingency (the initial greater adoption was purely
contingent) and sensitivity to initial conditions, but also some information-
preservation, as given the outcome of VCR dominance, we can extract some
information about some of the past states.
Another interesting combination of both orientations occurs in instances
where the initial state neither snowballs nor is erased, but where it simply
constrains future evolution. For example, developmental mechanisms, such
as the processes determined by the Hox genes, constrain possible body-plans
and thus the adaptations that are possible (Young and Hallgrmsson 2005).
There is a counterfactual dependence in the sense that past states (like a
certain conguration of the Hox genes) preclude some possible future states.
When the past constrains the outcome to the extent that only a single out-
come becomes possible, the phenomenon is known as `entrenchment' or the
`lock-in eect'. There is also some information-preservation here, as it is
possible to reconstruct the past to a certain extent.
II. Three challenges
With these phenomena in mind, three challenges face any account that at-
tempts to uncover the more formal structure of path-dependence. The rst
is to account for how path-dependence is a matter of degree. While some
measures have been intuitively suggested in the literature (e.g. Desjardins
2011a), a more rigorously developed account is lacking. This is partly due to
the fact that the literature is relatively new. However, perhaps it is partly
due to some confusion about two ways in which `degree' can be understood.
The rst way is when the past matters at multiple moments instead of
a single instant. Thus, insofar the evolution of the whale is represented
as depending on at least two moments (the transition from sh to land-
based animal, and from land-based to aquatic reptile) instead of just one in
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the case of VCR history (the instant when VCR happened to become more
frequent than Beta), the evolution of the whale can be considered more path-
dependent than that of the VCR. The outcome state gives more `information'
about the past in the rst case than in the second.
The second way the past matters `more' is when a dierence in the past
leads to a `greater' dierence in outcome. Thus the past matters `more' when
a buttery apping its wings leads to a hurricane than when the eects of
the apping are rapidly dissipated. Note that these two types of degree are
not necessarily equivalent: for example, if the hurricane happens to be some
attractor state, in such a way that any small disturbance would lead to the
hurricane, the fact of a buttery apping its wings is not very interesting to
explain why the hurricane occurred. More informative are the background
conditions (pressure, temperature dierentials) that had been forming; what
actually triggered the hurricane relatively unimportant. In this way, the
second measure of path-dependence does not concern how informative the
past is for explaining the present, but concerns the `distance' between possible
outcome states.
In this paper I will leave this second sense of degree aside, mainly because
the information-focused sense of degree is more fundamental and leads to in-
teresting connections with information theory. However, another reason is
that formalizing this second sense of degree would not be worthwhile for the
purposes of this paper. Allow me to briey sketch why. The distance-focused
degree can either refer nonlinearity or discontinuity.5 If one takes it to be
discontinuity, it is a discrete property of a process and hence not a good
candidate for a gradualist degree of path-dependence. If one interprets it as
nonlinearity, then one would need to detail what it means for one outcome
to be `very dierent' from another. Which metric is one to use on, for exam-
ple, the space of possible videocassette technologies? It seems impossible to
introduce any metric without relativizing it to explanatory interests. Thus,
if taken as nonlinearity, this distance-based degree of path-dependence seems
to mainly depend on what explanatory interests are at stake rather than on
the nature of path-dependence.
Besides accounting for how path-dependence comes in degrees, a second
challenge is that the evolution of a system may be path-dependent at only
5In brief, a function is linear when f(x + y) = f(x) + f(y); thus when a function is
nonlinear a slight change in input will lead to an eect that is not linearly proportionate,
and could potentially be very large. When a function is discontinuous, some modications
of the input, no matter how slight, will lead to relatively large eects. If a process is
nonlinear but continuous, small changes will still lead to small eects; however, in a
discontinuous process, some changes, no matter how small, will lead to lead to large
eects, even if the process is otherwise linear.
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certain times, or only with regard to certain outcome states. Thus path-
dependence seems to have dierent scopes, some more local, others more
global. A third, nal challenge concerns the way in which path-dependence
seems to depend on the grain of analysis adopted to describe the process.
For example, the evolution of the whale is path-dependent when one distin-
guishes between the two states `sh' and `marine mammal'; however, path-
dependence disappears when the outcome state is more coarsely described
(e.g. `aquatic animal').6 What counts as an adaptation or a constraint is to
some extent dependent on the grain of analysis (see Wilkins and Godfrey-
Smith 2009). In general, introducing a more ne-grained description of the
explanandum seems to make it more path-dependent: an account of path-
dependence should be able to integrate this fact.
III. Establishing a framework
In this section I will outline two dierent frameworks that have been proposed
to systematize these insights about path-dependence: attractor landscapes
and causal trees. The second framework has been explicitly developed in
some detail in Desjardins (2011a, 2011b), while I draw the rst framework
from a number of dierent accounts (Szathmary 2006, Bassanini and Dosi
1999, Desjardins 2015). Both frameworks have signicant (but interesting)
limitations, and are best seen as limiting cases of causal networks.
1. Attractor landscapes
An attractor is an equilibrium set of states towards which the system evolves
when it is in a given neighbourhood (the `basin'), and once in the attractor
state, the system will tend to return there if perturbed. Its usefulness as
a concept primarily lies in allowing for some long-term predictability, even
in dynamics that are nonlinear and chaotic. An attractor is global when
its basin covers all of state space, or local, when the basin is a subset of
state space. In what I call an `attractor landscape', each state is assigned a
scalar variable (on a two-dimensional landscape, this is the height), with the
attractors being local maxima (or minima), and the system tending towards
maximizing (or minimizing) the scalar variable. Examples of such landscapes
are potential energy landscapes, where valleys in the landscape correspond
to minimal-energy states, or adaptive landscapes, where the peaks represent
states with maximal tness.
6See also Figure 6.
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Landscapes can be used to systematize some aspects of path-dependence,
for example, the distinction between information-preserving and information-
destroying processes. Reconstructability becomes impossible when the ex-
planandum (the outcome state) is a global attractor state, because any pos-
sible initial state tends towards the attractor state. When there are multiple
attractors present, the process is partially information-preserving, as one can
extract some information about the past (namely, in which basin the system
was initially located) from the outcome.
With this in mind, one could formulate path-dependence in terms of the
following negative condition:
Denition (Path-dependence - attractor formulation). An explanation of
an outcome is path-dependent if and only if that outcome is not explained as
a global attractor.
Note that `global' is always dened relative to the state space under consid-
eration. The middle of the bowl is a global attractor when the state space
is conned to the positions of the marble on the hollow surface of the bowl;
it (obviously) is no longer an attractor when the marble is placed next to
the bowl. Thus, when an attractor is deemed global within the scope of
the explanation, then which precise initial state obtains does not make any
dierence for the outcome, as the system will be in the attractor state. Con-
versely, when there is no global attractor, then there are at least two initial
states that lead to dierent outcomes.
The accounts of Bassanini and Dosi (1999) and Szathmary (2006) im-
plicitly draw on this criterion. Szathmary distinguishes between `strong' and
`weak' path-dependence (not to be confused with Ereshevsky's distinction).
Strong path dependence occurs when the process is irreversible and when
there are multiple stable attractors. This is straightforwardly covered by the
attractor formulation.
However, what Szathmary calls weak path-dependence could seem prob-
lematic for this denition. An outcome may not be a global attractor, and yet
have occurred path-independently in the weak sense, as long as the causal-
dependence on initial conditions is `eectively' eliminated as time goes to
innity.7 This type of weak path-dependence will tend to occur in high-
7Eective elimination is what Bassanini and Dosi (1999:15) call asymptotic path-
independence, which occurs when two possible trajectories come arbitrarily close within
a nite time-span, and for an innite number of times thereafter. (If the dynamics is
Markovian, then this condition reduces to: two possible trajectories intersect in nite time,
because once there is a single intersection, it is expected that the paths will overlap for all
subsequent times.) If this condition is met, then the dierence an initial condition makes
on a subsequent history is eliminated in nite time. In this way, weak path-independence
is a form of ergodicity.
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dimensional state spaces, when the number of possible states is `much' greater
than the number of states actualized over the course of a system's history,
so that the asymptotic convergence of possible trajectories will tend not to
occur (Szathmary 2006).
Nonetheless, weak path-dependence is also covered by the attractor for-
mulation, because the asymptotic convergence that Bassanini and Dosi de-
scribe concerns the convergence of the average position of a trajectory. Even
though the actual instantaneous positions of two possible trajectories will in
general be very dierent at any given time, when a system is weakly path-
dependent, the long-run average position converges to a global equilibrium
state.8 Thus, whether or not the past matters in weak path-dependence de-
pends on what precisely the explanandum is: the average position over a
long period of time (past does not matter), or the actual position at a spe-
cic time (past does matter). By contrast, strong path-dependence implies
that both the instantaneous and the long-run average position converge to a
single attractor state.
The landscape framework has serious limitations. An area where it has
already received signicant criticism is in its application to biological evolu-
tion in the short- to middle-term (i.e. adaptive landscapes).9 One important
criticism concerns how landscapes change when the dimensionality of state
space is increased. Landscapes imply that a system can evolve smoothly to
a neighbouring state; Gavrilets (2004) has shown how the topology of high-
dimensional adaptive landscapes tends to consist of`ridges', `rugged peaks'
and `holes' than of smooth hills. The likelihood increases of a (nearly) neutral
network forming, and of the number of local peaks increasing (see Gavrilets
2004, 45-80). The absolute scalar dierence (in this case, tness) between
any two states becomes increasingly meaningless for predicting whether one
state will evolve into the other or not.
What this suggests is that according as one needs more variables to char-
acterize a particular outcome, the less likely one will be able to analyze the
occurrence of that outcome as some kind of optimum of a single scalar quan-
tity (e.g. tness). While the attractor formulation of path-dependence may
remain true, it becomes increasingly empty, as simple global attractors tend
to not occur at all in complex systems. Knowing the height of a peak is
increasingly useless as the landscape is increasingly ridged and holey.
8Compare with Doeblin's theorem in the theory of Markov processes (e.g. Stroock
2005).
9Note that while some have argued in their defense that they are best used as an
explanatory template, as a heuristic for hypothesis generation (Ruse 1996, Skipper 2004),
others have questioned their adequacy even as metaphor (Kaplan and Pigliucci 2006,
Kaplan 2008, Plutynski 2008).
10
In this way, attractor landscapes cannot represent many interesting path-
dependent processes; they are best suited to represent convergent processes,
or processes where there is a choice between multiple local attractors.10
Causal trees are better suited for evolutions in high-dimensional spaces,
where the probability that causal paths intersect is very low, and thus where
every state actualized is unique.
2. Causal trees
In the following I will briey outline a formal characterization of trees, and
then (drawing on the work of Desjardins) consider how path-dependence can
be formulated within this framework. I will try to show that this frame-
work is in a sense the opposite of attractor landscapes: best suited for
high-dimensional state spaces, but weak at representing convergent causal
structures.
A tree is a causal graph rooted in a single point, from which branches
split o but never join as one moves from past to present. The states of
a tree form a partially ordered set of states, where every state has only a
single immediate predecessor, but can have any number of successors. Thus
not every pair of states can be connected by a forward-directed causal chain,
even though every state in a tree is indirectly causally linked through a
common ancestor.
Figure 1: Path dependence in
a causal tree (source: Des-
jardins 2011)
A causal tree maps out the possible
paths an individual entity can follow. If the
system consists only of a single entity, only
a single path will actually be followed; if the
system is an ensemble of individual entities,
there will be a distribution over the possi-
ble paths according to the probabilities of
the paths. The branching events or nodes,
which connect a single state to two or more
possible descendant states, can be thought
of as abstractions of contingent events with
causal impact on the path of the system. For
example, in macroevolutionary phylogenetic
trees the nodes abstractly represent specia-
tion events, where a given biological popula-
tion diverges to two or more distinct species.
10Compare this with the analysis of conservative vector elds: if a dynamics can be
represented as the gradient of a scalar, then it is path-independent.
11
With this in place, one can formulate path-dependence in the following
way (adopted from Desjardins 2015)11:
Denition (Path-dependence - causal tree formulation). An explanation of
an outcome is path-dependent if 1/ a given initial state branches o into at
least two paths, 2/ these paths lead to at least two possible outcomes (with
non-zero probability), and 3/ following dierent paths aects the probability
of a given outcome state.
Figure 2: Path
dependence in a
causal network
This formulation of path-dependence captures some
crucial properties, such as unpredictability contingency
and causal-dependence contingency. It can also be used
to capture the information-preserving aspect of path-
dependence, and the way in which it can come in degrees
(Desjardins 2011a). However, I would like to point to
three limitations. The rst and foremost is that, in con-
trast to attractor landscapes, causal trees cannot cap-
ture causal relationships where branches join. This is a
problem for even the formulation of path-dependence,
as path-dependence presupposes that there are alterna-
tive paths leading to the same outcome, and thus some
convergence. This can be seen more clearly by redrawing Figure 1 so that
the same states are represented by the same points; then the causal model
becomes Figure 2, which is, strictly speaking, no longer a causal tree.
Figure 3: Path-
dependent or not?
Putting this problem aside (for example, by expand-
ing the notion of tree to allow for some reticulations),
it remains unclear how to analyze cases with multiple
possible initial states. For example, in Figure 3, none of
the paths leading to o1 aect the probability of o1 occur-
ring, and thus the occurrence of o1 does not seem to be
path-dependent in the sense that its occurrence is not
aected by the choice of path. Yet, there is a clear de-
pendence on initial conditions, for if one knows that the
initial state is s0, the probability of o1 occurring is :4,
as opposed to :8, if s0 were to be the initial state. The
example in Figure 3 thus seems to involve some combi-
nation of path-dependence and path-independence that
is not captured by the causal tree formulation.
11For a more mathematical characterization, see Desjardins (2011a).
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Figure 4: Path-
dependent or not?
A second, related limitation is that the causal tree
formulation concerns only whether the occurrence of an
outcome is path-dependent, but it is unclear how it can
be applied to a set or distribution of states, or how path-
dependence is something that can change over time. In
other words, the tree formulation does not seem to allow
for dierent scopes of path-dependence. For example,
in a more complex model such as Figure 4, there seem
to be pockets of path-independence, even though the
process may be globally path-dependent. The origin
of this limitation lies less in the specic formulation of
path-dependence, but rather in the causal tree framework itself; this is one
important reason for representing causal relationships by causal networks
(directed acyclical graphs).
Finally, it remains unclear how precisely the degree of path-dependence
should be dened. Desjardins (2011a) suggests two types of metric that
roughly correspond to those mentioned in section II. The rst is the degree
of divergence or convergence, where maximal divergence is maximal path-
dependence and maximal convergence is maximal path-independence. The
second is the degree of `similarity' between outcomes: a causal tree is more
path-dependent when the dierent outcomes are more dissimilar. However,
it would be desirable to introduce a more precise, quantitative measure.12 It
is not clear, within a causal tree, what `similarity' between outcomes could
mean without introducing some independent scalar metric.
3. Causal networks
As done with causal trees, I will now construct causal networks with some
more formal detail. Besides allowing for increased generality when describing
path-dependence, there are two further advantages of doing this. The rst
is that it will become clear how a model can be coarse-grained to obtain
either a causal tree or an attractor landscape, thus showing how the two
frameworks are limiting cases of causal networks. The second is that it
places path-dependence within the context of graph theory, to which the
tools of information theory can be readily applied, and this will allow for a
quantitative measure of path-dependence to be proposed.
A causal network is a directed, acyclical graph represented by the or-
dered pair (V;E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges
12Also, it can be shown that maximal divergence is, perhaps surprisingly, a case of
maximal path-independence (see Figure 8).
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connecting the nodes. In this paper, causal networks are taken to be for-
malizations of causal explanations, and hence certain nodes are of particular
interest, namely the outcome states and the initial states. For this reason it
will be useful to think of the ordered pair (V;E) as a 3-tuple (O; I;R) where
O is the set of outcome states, I the set of initial states, and R : O ! I a web
of causal relations between initial and outcome states. The causal relations
themselves may be productive or dierence-making | the precise nature
of causality will not be of concern here. In general, causal networks will
contain intermediate states, between the sets of initial and outcome states.
Letting these intermediate sets of states be represented by Oi = Ii+1, with
I = I0, O = On, the relation R can be decomposed in n + 1 instants: R =
R0 R1     Rn, where each Ri : Ii ! Oi is a simple mapping relation.
Three basic causal patterns will be of interest. In a parallel structure,
the outcome would not have obtained if a particular initial state had not
been present. Thus, there is at most one initial state associated with a
given outcome, and in this way the parallel structure corresponds to causal-
dependence contingency. By contrast, in a divergent structure, multiple
outcomes are associated with a single initial state. This means that, given
the initial state, the descendant state cannot be predicted: this is unpre-
dictability contingency. When the structure is neither parallel nor divergent,
it is convergent, and this occurs when multiple initial states converge on
a single outcome state. A path-dependent explanation, as actually used in
scientic practise, is almost invariably a complex combination of these basic
structures.
Figure 5: Parallel, di-
vergent and convergent
structures.
The probability of an outcome in a particular
explanatory framework can be calculated by means
of the probability distribution over initial states,
and the probabilities of the dierent paths between
an initial state and the outcome. By the law of to-
tal probability we get P (o) =
P
i P (i)P (oji). Each
conditional probability P (oji) can be written as
P (oji) = Pp P (pio) = PpQijo (j ! j + 1),
where the pio are the dierent paths connecting ini-
tial state i to outcome o, and where (j ! j + 1)
represents the transition probability connecting two
intermediary states. Thus the probability of an out-
come is ultimately reducible to the initial proba-
bility distribution and the structure of the causal
pathways leading up to the outcome.
In general, the causal structure changes by ne-graining or coarse-graining
the degree of analysis. Fine-graining can be thought of as introducing a
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new variable to characterize the initial or outcome states, and in this way
states that were previously identical become dierentiated. More explicitly,
a state may be characterized by n variables, s = (x1; x2; :::; xn), and one
example of ne-graining is to introduce m new degrees of freedom, dening
a new state s0 = (x1; x2; :::; xn; :::; xn+m). So a single state s in n-dimensional
space corresponds a m-dimensional set in the ne-grained (n+m)-dimensional
space. In this way ne-graining can be thought of as a one to many mapping,
where a single state is replaced by a set of states.
The inverse operation is coarse-graining, and this is done by means of an
equivalence relation , which allows one to express that multiple states are
`similar' in some way. The equivalence relation denes an equivalence class
on the states, O= , where all the states which are `similar' are represented
by a single state. One way this can be done is by abstraction, where certain
degrees of freedom are dropped, so that only the other features of a state are
considered.
This oers a rst step in making sense of how path-dependence is sensi-
tive to the grain of analysis adopted in a causal model. Taking the whale's
evolution as an example, what is striking here is that there is both con-
vergence towards a sh-like morphology, and a divergence in other respects
(such as bone-structure or respiratory system). One way to analyze this is
that, when the aquatic mammal state (AM) and sh state (F) are charac-
terized by a single variable | their overall morphology | is that they are
the same state; when the two states are characterized by additional variables
(bone-structure, respiratory system, etc.), the two states are non-indentical.
In the rst case, the paths F  M   AM and F   F   F converge; in the
second, ne-graining introduces path-dependence in the representation of the
evolutionary process (gure 6).
Figure 6: Two representations of the evolution of the whale. The right
side representation is models the evolutionary process in detail, and is path-
dependent. The left side one coarse-grains over the aquatic mammal state
(AM) and sh state (F), and represents the evolution of AM as path-
independent (or, at least, more path-indepedent: see later).
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One can summarize the eects of the grain of analysis on causal structure
by means of the following (a proof is provided in the appendix):
Theorem 1. A coarse-graining of the explanandum makes an explanation
increasingly convergent and a coarse-graining of the explanans makes an ex-
planation increasingly divergent.
This theorem gives some deeper insight into why attractor landscapes
and causal trees are limited. In any attractor landscape, there is a countable
number of privileged outcomes (attractor states), and each of these outcomes
will have an associated subset of the initial states (the basin). When state
space is described at a ner level of detail | e.g. when more variables are
needed to adequately describe each state | the convergence of each basin on
its respective attractor state will tend to decrease. A given attractor state
will be disambiguated between two dierent states, each with its own basin.
Ultimately, when the outcome states are described with sucient detail, there
will be no convergent structures any longer, only parallel structures, and the
landscape metaphor disintegrates.
By contrast, the causal tree framework tends to be adequate as long as the
number of possible states is much greater relative to the number of realized
initial states, so that the probability of reticulations occurring is small. For
example, this occurs when the dimensionality of the state space is relatively
large. Taking the number of variables necessary to describe an entity to
be a proxy for the complexity of that entity, this can also be formulated in
terms of complexity. The dynamics of an individual, complex entity is likely
to be path-dependent. By coarse-graining the state space (representing the
complex entity abstractly) while keeping the number of initial states constant,
the convergence of the network increases monotonically, and the `tree-ness'
of the network decreases. In this way a causal tree can be seen as the limiting
case of a causal network when the state space is much larger than the set of
initial states.
IV. The symmetry formulation
In this section, the main contribution of this paper, I will propose how the
concept of symmetry breaking can be used to characterize path-dependence
and historicity in causal networks. The motivation for this proposal comes
from the two main ways symmetry is used in physics (see also Brading and
Castellani 2007). The rst, and most intuitive application of symmetries is
to properties of a system, usually spatial congurations. A spatial congura-
tion is symmetrical when it remains the same under some distance-preserving
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permutation of the elements (reections, inversions and rotations). For exam-
ple, a snowake has some rotational symmetries (its appearance is unchanged
when you rotate it by a multiple of 30°), reection symmetries and a point
symmetry. Similarly, a liquid has a maximal spatial symmetry: no matter
how one would rotate, invert or reect it, it would look the same. Such
symmetry is broken during the transition to a solid: a particular molecular
structure arises which will typically only have a limited number of symme-
tries.
Symmetries are also applied to the dynamics of a system, i.e. the way in
which two subsequent states of a system relate to each other. Thus, instead of
transforming the physical elements of the system, the variables in the laws of
motion are transformed, and a symmetry is said to be present when the laws
of motion remain invariant. In other words, the transformation is a symmetry
of the dynamics if the transformed variables are related to each other in the
same way as the untransformed variables are. One well known example is
the time symmetry of Newtonian dynamics: because the second law gives a
relation between the force and the second time-derivative of position (i.e. the
acceleration), it is invariant under the transformation t !  t. Thus, if one
were to see an animation of a group of interacting particles, one could not
tell by Newtonian dynamics alone whether the animation was being played
forwards or backwards. In thermodynamic phenomena this time symmetry
is broken: heat ows from warm to cold (the entropy increases), but never
from cold to warm. A rewinded heat ow does not obey the second law of
thermodynamics.
Here I will apply symmetry to the causal paths between intermediary
states and a particular outcome. A network will be symmetrical when the
dierent intermediary states can be permuted without aecting the causal
structure of the network. Just as the snowake remains unaected by rota-
tions, path-independent causal networks remain unaected by permutations
of intermediary states. In itself, this basic idea is not much more than a
reformulation of path-independence in the broad sense; however, it oers the
resources to deal with some of the shortcomings of the tree and landscape
frameworks.
1. Symmetry
More formally, let Ps be the probability distribution over the outcomes given
that the system is in state s. One way to think of Ps is as the probabilities
of the dierent possible outcomes as `viewed from' s. The probability of
any particular outcome o as viewed from s can be written as the sum of the
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probabilities of the dierent possible paths between s and o:
Ps(o) = P (ojs) =
X
p
P (pos)
where the variable pos represents the possible paths between o and s. When
there is only a single initial state s0, one can assign an unconditional proba-
bility to an outcome P (o) = Ps0(o). This is the case in causal trees; however,
in a general causal network, there is no unique way of specifying the uncon-
ditional probability of an outcome.
Note that these probabilities need not imply any fundamental indetermin-
ism. For example, in ecological systems of foraging rabbits, the dynamics of
how rabbits move around may not be fundamentally indeterministic, and
may be perfectly predictable if, for example, the position, visual cues and
neural states of the rabbits are perfectly known. Yet, we may choose to ig-
nore such details, and to characterize the state of a rabbit in terms of position
only. This is obviously an underdeterminantion, and multiple outcomes will
be possible given the same position. In this way, coarse-graining and even
ignoring certain variables can give rise to probabilistic causal relations (see
Strevens 2006, Matthen 2009). For purposes of this paper the precise nature
of these probabilities need not concern us further, and we will treat them
simply as given.
The notion of causal symmetry can be assigned dierent scopes, some
more local, others more global:
Denition (localized to time and outcome). A causal network is causally
symmetric towards outcome o at time t when the biases of any two
states s and s0 at time t towards o are equal: Ps(o) = Ps0(o).
This notion of symmetry is relevant for the question as to whether a
particular instant in the past matters for a particular outcome. When the
explanatory interest concerns the question whether any past state matters for
a particular outcome, the following scope of symmetry is more appropriate:
Denition (localized to outcome). A causal network is causally symmet-
ric towards outcome o when the biases of any two states s and s0 towards
an outcome o (at any time t) are equal: Ps = Ps0.
This type of symmetry corresponds most closely to how path-dependence
was formulated in the causal tree formulation, except that now an allowance
is made for multiple possible initial states. Symmetry can also be localized
to time alone:
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Denition (localized to time). A causal network is causally symmetric
at time t when the biases of any two states s and s0 at time t (towards any
outcome o) are equal: Ps = Ps0.
Finally, a properly `global' notion of symmetry can be formulated, as
to predicate path-dependence about an explanation as a whole, not just an
outcome: a network can be said to be causally symmetric when it is
causally symmetric at every time t (or equivalently, towards any outcome o).
This concept of global symmetry entails the three local notions of symmetry,
and the most localized notion of symmetry is implied by the three others.
The transformation group associated with global symmetry is the group
of permutations of the intermediary states at any given time. Global sym-
metry arises when the conditional probability distribution over the outcomes
remains invariant under permutation of the intermediary states at any given
time (this includes the initial states).
Figure 7 illustrates how these four scopes of symmetry can diverge. First,
the network is not globally symmetric, since, for example, P (o1js4) = 1=2 6=
0 = P (o1js5). Thus, in order to explain why o1 occurred, it is relevant that
s4 and not s5 occurred. However, the network is symmetric with regards to
some outcomes at some particular times. For example, at t5 the network
is symmetric towards o2 as P (o2js3) = P (o2js4) = P (o2js5) = 1=2. It does
not matter what state the system is in at t5 to explain why o2 occurred.
Similarly, the network is symmetric towards o3 at t3.
Figure 7: An illustration of how the dierent notions of symmetry come
apart. Each state branches out in an equiprobable way.
Concerning the two other notions of symmetry, the network is symmmet-
ric at t3, as the biases of s1, s2 and s3 are equal towards any of the outcomes
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oj. In an explanation of any outcome, it will not matter what state the sys-
tem was in at t3. Finally, the network is symmetric towards o3. To explain
why o3 occurred, it will not be necessary to integrate any information about
the past. Regardless of the path the system took, o3 would have occurred
with probability 1=3.
Figure 8: Fun-
damental pat-
tern of symme-
try.
Deepening the parallel with spatial symmetries, causal
symmetry can be given a geometric interpretation within a
causal network. A network is symmetric at time t if every
state at that instant t branches out to all descendant states
in an identical way. Thus the branching pattern emitted
by one state must be mirrored by all other possible states
at that time. This basic pattern is represented in Figure 8,
where the thickness of the lines is a measure for the prob-
ability of the dierent transitions. Some descendant states
may be very improbable while others may be heavily biased;
what matters is that the biases are symmetric across the dif-
ferent initial states. At a symmetric instant in the network,
the dierent states can be exchanged and permuted without
the causal structure being aected.
This basic pattern of symmetry is both maximally di-
vergent and maximally convergent. It is maximally divergent because each
state branches out towards all possible descendant states; it is maximally
convergent because each descendant state is converged upon by all possible
predecessor states.
Anticipating the next section, where symmetry is linked with path-indepen-
dence, this fact suggests that path-dependence is to be sought between the
extremes of perfect predictability and perfect unpredictability. Both the
perfectly predictable network | where all paths converge onto a single out-
come | and the perfectly unpredictable network | where all states di-
verge maximally | are ahistorical. Path-dependence requires some degree
of unpredictability, but maximal unpredictability contingency implies path-
independence. This is a concrete result that precludes any simple identica-
tion of unpredictability contingency with historicity (e.g. Beatty).
An additional eect of the basic pattern of symmetry is one of erasing
history. In Figure 7, the network up until t3 could be replaced by any arbi-
trary causal network without any dierence being made to which outcome
obtains. This eect is encapsulated in the following result:
Theorem 2. If a causal network is symmetrical at t, it is also symmetric at
all prior instants. The bias of any state towards a given outcome is shared
throughout the states at any given time, and is preserved over time.
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Thus a sucient condition for global symmetry is that only the last causal
transition is symmetrical, i.e. each direct parent of the outcome states
branches out to all outcomes. Note that, given such a symmetrical struc-
ture, none of the intermediary states aects the outcome, and hence there is
no history to erase, strictly speaking. History matters only to which interme-
diary states occur (even though these intermediary states are not the target
of the explanation), and before the occurrence of the symmetrical pattern, it
is possible to reconstruct the past. Once a symmetrical pattern occurs, such
reconstruction is impossible.13
A concrete example that could be represented by such a causal structure
is mass extinctions. To the extent that one can idealize mass extinctions
as the random selection of certain phenotypes (without regard to tness), it
is impossible to reconstruct the distribution of phenotypes before the mass
extinction given the distribution after the extinction.14 Even though non-
symmetric processes may have dominated up until the point of the mass
extinction, once the mass extinction has taken place, the eect of these pro-
cesses on history is wiped out.
2. Symmetry breaking
These dierent notions of symmetry are dierent ways in which the past
does not matter, dierent ways in which the system is independent of the
path taken. Path-dependence itself can be formulated as the breaking of
symmetry, and thus has dierent scopes as well.
Denition (Path-dependence - symmetry formulation). A causal network is
path-dependent relative to a certain scope if and only if the symmetry relative
to that scope has been broken.
In this way, a network may be globally path-dependent even though at certain
times it may be path-independent, or even though certain outcomes may
emerge in a path-independent way.
The attractor and causal tree formulations of path-dependence can be
seen as special cases of this more general denition. If a causal network
converges onto a global attractor, this means that any two states s and s0 at
any time t will lead to the outcome with probability 1: Ps(o) = P
0
s(o) = 1.
Conversely, if the outcome is not a global attractor, there is at least one
13Thus it is impossible for history to matter for an outcome some time in the past, but
not at the penultimate stage (compare with Desjardins 2015).
14In this way, while mass extinctions introduce contingency into evolution (as famously
emphasized by Gould 1989), to the extent that they make the reconstruction of the past
more dicult, they actually remove some degree of historicity.
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Figure 9: Unconditional probabilities of outcomes vs. path-dependence.
possible state that is not in the basin of that outcome. In this case there are
at least two states s or s0 that have a dierent bias towards the outcome at
some time t: the symmetry towards o is broken.
In the tree-framework, path-dependence was limited to comparing possi-
ble paths leading to one of a number of possible outcomes. The requirements
of the causal tree formulation of path-dependence { there must be multi-
ple possible outcomes (i.e. so that convergence can only be partial), and
that paths towards some outcome aect the probability of the outcome { are
captured within the negation of symmetry (localized to time and outcome).
These requirements can be deduced by the condition that at least two states
on dierent paths have a dierent bias towards the outcome.
The signicance of this denition may be further illustrated by pointing
out what it does not entail. First, it does not entail that no outcome is
probabilistically privileged. Some outcomes may be more likely than others,
and yet the network is symmetrical; all outcomes may be equiprobable, and
the network path-dependent (Figure 9). The unconditional probability of an
outcome is irrelevant; what matters is whether the conditional probabilities
are equal or not.
A second orthogonal distinction is between path-dependence and the
probabilities of the paths. The occurrence of an outcome may be path-
independent, even though some paths may be heavily biased. For example,
on the left side of Figure 9, there are three possible paths towards o1. Even if
the system may be much more likely to pass by s1 than the other intermediary
states (e.g. x = 0:98 and y = z = 0:01), P (o1jsi) = 1=2 for each intermediary
state si. History does not matter: it makes no dierence whether the system
takes the s1 path or the s2 path, in each case o1 will obtain with probability
1=2.
Thus, in a path-independent network it may be possible to reconstruct
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Figure 10: Symmetry towards o2 is broken, even though all paths to o2
equiprobable.
the past; conversely, retrodictability may be impossible in a path-dependent
network. Such is the case in Figure 10, where the two possible paths to-
wards o2 are equiprobable, but yet where the symmetry is broken at the
intermediate states since P (o2js1) = 2=3 6= 1=3 = P (o2js2).
There is no retrodictability here since, given that the system is in o2,
it is equiprobable that the system passed through s1 as through s2.
15 The
relation between retrodictability and path-dependence will be taken up again
in the nal section, but since this result may seem puzzling here, one can
illustrate it with an example. Say that s1 represents `nancial crisis' and
s2 represents the avoidance of a nancial crisis. The outcome state o2 is
a state of revolution. A nancial crisis may be very improbable, but yet,
once it occurs, revolution may be very likely. Conversely, a revolution may
occur spontaneously with a very small likelihood. Even though these two
paths may be equiprobable, if society actually underwent a nancial crisis,
any historian would integrate this information to explain the outcome.
3. Symmetry preservation and restoration
An additional advantage of the symmetry formulation is that it can distin-
guish between dierent scopes of path-dependence. Certain parts of a causal
network may behave in a path-independent way, even though the network as
a whole is path-dependent. The past may not matter in the causal explana-
15By Bayes' rule, P (s1jo2) = P (o2js1)P (s1)P (o2) =
2=31=3
4=9 = 1=2.
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Figure 11: Weak global attractor: convergence and path-dependence.
tion of a particular outcome, but yet may matter in the explanation of the
set of outcomes. Or, the evolution of the system may be path-independent
until a certain moment in time, after which the causal network becomes path-
dependent. Path-dependence (localized to time) can emerge at a particular
instant in the causal network.
Two combinations are of particular interest: cases where symmetry to-
wards a particular outcome is preserved, despite global symmetry being bro-
ken, and cases where global symmetry is restored for a subset of the causal
network. An example of the rst is represented in Figure 11. Here the out-
come o is a global attractor in the sense that all possible initial states can
evolve towards o, and the occurrence of o is path-independent as all prior
states are equally biased towards o. Yet global symmetry is broken in the
network as a whole.
Such a state o can be termed a weak global attractor : a state that remains
a possibility with a xed probability regardless of the path the system takes.
When a weak global attractor is present in a network, a local symmetry is
preserved, even though the global symmetry may be broken.
The second case of particular interest concerns states that branch out
towards all possible descendant states in an equiprobable way. Evolvability
would be a concrete example of this causal structure.16 For example, in
most mammals, forelimb and hindlimb are locked by certain developmental
constraints in a 1:1 ratio. A species can evolve longer hindlimbs only if the
16The analysis given in Brown (2014) can be seen as dealing with this causal structure.
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Figure 12: The ancestral money population (AM) branches into quadrupedal
monkey (QM) and ape (A). The latter state has the capacity to evolve any
limb ratio; the former can only keep the 1:1 ratio.
forelimbs grow by the same amount. However, in ancestral ape populations,
a proper subset of quadrupedal monkeys, this constraint was relaxed, to
allow for dierent possible ratios. A more formal representation would look
something like gure 12.
Once the intermediary state A is realized, which outcome state (limb ra-
tio) actually reached depends on the environment. In an extreme case, if
absolutely no information about A's environment is available, all possible
outcomes are to be modelled as equiprobable. This means that once A oc-
curs, it no longer matters for the outcome what preceded that state. The
causal network emanating from A constitutes a symmetrical causal tree. To
the extent some outcomes can be privileged over others, symmetry is only
restored to a certain degree (see next section). In either case, the state A can
be thought of as a `exible' state: it partially restores symmetry, limited to
a subset of the whole causal networked. Thus, while global symmetry once
broken cannot ever be restored, global symmetry can be locally restored (to
a certain degree).
V. Degree of path-dependence
No account of path-dependence can be considered complete without giving
some criterion of how history matters more in some processes than in oth-
ers. We will focus only on how to quantify path-dependence according to
how informationally relevant the past is for the outcomes. As already men-
tioned, a possible alternative way to measure path-dependence could be by
quantifying how much an outcome changes if past states are changed. This
would require the introduction of a separate metric (presumably dependent
on explanatory interests) of what it means for outcomes to be close or dis-
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tant, with associated problems (see section II). Instead, the focus will be on
quantifying the degree of information given by the past in such a way that
is consistent with the account of path-dependence presented thusfar.
1. Prediction and Retrodiction
In this approach, path-dependence is closely related to predictability and
retrodictability in the following sense. An outcome is more predictable if
a past state contains more information about which outcome will occur.
Likewise, the past is retrodictable from the present if the outcome contains
information about which causal path had been followed.
However, path-dependence precludes both perfect predictability and per-
fect unpredictability. Recall how a convergent network is perfectly pre-
dictable but path-independent, and a maximally divergent network is un-
predictable but is also path-independent. In deciding then whether or not a
network is path-dependent , it is thus irrelevant whether the outcome can or
cannot be predicted from a past state.
The same point can be made about retrodictability. Thus it may be
possible to know with fair certainty what causal path the system has followed,
but for the network still to be symmetrical and hence path-independent. In
Figure 9, we can know with fair certainty, given o1, that the system passed
through s1, even though passing through s1 did not aect the probability
of o1. Retrodictability is possible despite path-independence towards o1.
Conversely, the outcome state may not contain any information about which
causal path was followed, and yet the network can be path-dependent. This
is the case in Figure 10, where both paths leading to o2 are equiprobable, but
where the choice between s1 and s2 aects the probability of the outcome.
The relation between predictability (retrodictability) and path-dependence
can be made more precise by observing that the amount of information the
past contains about the present is not relevant for path-dependence, but
rather that the past contributes to predictability. Thus, in a network con-
verging on a single outcome, the outcome is perfectly predictable regardless
of whether the precise past state is known. However, knowing the past does
not contribute any information not already contained by the structure of the
causal network. Neither does it matter how much information the present
contains about the past, but only how much the present aects retrodictabil-
ity. In Figure 10, knowing which of the two intermediary states is reached
helps to predict which of the three outcomes is likely to occur, whereas know-
ing which outcome occurred aects retrodictability.
One may wonder here if contribution to predictability and contribution to
retrodictability are equivalent. If they were not equivalent, one would need
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to distinguish between two measures of path-dependence: a forward-oriented
and a past-oriented measure. However, it is straightforward to show that
they are equivalent.
Assume the past does not aect predictability, then the probability of an
outcome conditional on an earlier state is simply the unconditional probabil-
ity: P (ojjs) = P (oj). Thus, in a network where the past does not contribute
to predictability, the conditional probability of an outcome is equal to the
unconditional probability. Similarly, it is the contribution of the present
to the retrodictability of the past that matters. It does not matter when
P (sjoj) = P (s) for every previous state s of a given outcome oj. We would
want to show that if P (ojjs) = P (oj) for every outcome oj and intermediate
state s, then P (sjoj) = P (s) (and vice versa).
From Bayes' rule,
P (sjoj) = P (ojjs)P (s)
P (oj)
and the desired result follows from the assumption that the past does not
aect predictability. Thus it is impossible for the past to aect predictability
without the present aecting retrodictability, and vice versa.
2. Mutual information
Predictability is the lack of uncertainty of what the outcome state will be.
Thus maximal unpredictability corresponds to a uniform probability distribu-
tion over the possible outcomes; maximal predictability assigns probability
1 to a single outcome and zero to the rest. In this way the conditional
entropy of O given s,
Hs(O) =  
X
o
Ps(o) logPs(o) =  
X
o
P (ojs) logP (ojs);
is a good measure for how predictable the outcomes seem from the perspective
of intermediary state s. It has a number of desirable properties: it is maximal
for a uniform distribution, and zero when one of the outcomes is certain. A
dierent conditional entropy, of O given S is obtained by taking the weighted
average over the states in S:
H(OjS) =
X
s
P (s)Hs(O):
The extent to which knowing past states S reduces uncertainty | the
quantity, we have argued, relevant to path-dependence as symmetry breaking
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| is measured by the mutual information between the outcome states O
and the set of past states S at some instant t:
I(O;S) =
X
o;s
p(o; s) log
p(o; s)
p(o)p(s)
(1)
Note that this formulation of mutual information is a measure of path-
dependence localized to a particular instant in the causal network. Analogous
measures can be formulated for the other notions of symmetry (both local
and global); however, the measure 1 is sucient to extract the philosophically
interesting properties.
Mutual information is consistent with the symmetry account of path-
dependence in many dierent respects. First, mutual information is nonneg-
ative I(O;S)  0, and zero if and only if the causal network is symmetric at
s 2 S. This can be seen as follows. If the network is symmetric at s, then for
any given outcome state o and s 2 S: p(ojs) = p(ojs) . From this and The-
orem 2 can be deduced that these conditional probabilities are equal for all
ancestor nodes, including any of the initial states s0: p(ojs) = p(ojs0) = p(o).
In this case p(o; s) = p(ojs)p(s) = p(o)p(s) and hence
I(O;S) =
X
o;s
p(o)p(s) log 1
= 0
The mutual information is zero. The opposite also holds true: if mutual
information is zero between O and S, then p(o; s) = p(o)p(s) for every s 2
S.17 This implies symmetry.
Second, the claim that path-dependence is to be measured by information-
contribution rather than information-content is underlined by the relation
between mutual information and Shannon entropy.18 Mutual information
represents the information gain represented by an intermediate state:
I(O;S) = H(O) H(OjS) (2)
Thus, the degree of path-dependence is measured by the reduction in the un-
certainty of the outcome states when information about a later intermediary
state S is integrated. Path-independence arises when there is no change in
entropy content.
17For the derivation, see e.g. Cover and Thomas 1991, Ch. 2
18See Cover and Thomas 1991.
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This suggests another way of viewing this aspect of path-dependence,
in terms of the divergence of probability distributions. Mutual informa-
tion can be expressed as the degree by which the unconditional p(O) and
the conditional distribution p(OjS) diverge.19 When there is no divergence,
p(OjS) = p(O) and the outcome states are independent of the intermediary
states S. Thus also in this respect, mutual information seems to be a natural
operationalization of the symmetry formulation of path-dependence.
Third, mutual information is symmetric, i.e. I(O;S) = I(S;O). This
means that the present is relevant for the past in exactly the same way that
the past is relevant for the present. This allows the previous arguments about
the relation between path-dependence and predictability to be represented
more formally. Here follows the case for predictability; identical reasoning
can be applied to retrodictability (where Ho(S) is the relevant measure for
retrodictability). Perfect unpredictability means that the conditional entropy
of the outcome states O is maximal, at any given set of intermediary states S.
This means that the unconditional entropy H(O), which, in our framework,
is the conditional entropy given the initial states S0, is also maximal. Hence
the mutual information I(O;S) is zero, implying path-independence. Perfect
predictability implies that the unconditional entropy Hs(O) is zero at every
S; hence I(O;S) is likewise zero.
This operationalization allows for information-theoretic analyses of path-
dependence. Two interesting lines of inquiry for further research can be
pointed to. A rst concerns how mutual information changes as the grain
of analysis changes. Thus, in the introduction we outlined how the path-
dependence of a process depended on how both the initial states and the
outcome states were described. The same process could be described as path-
dependent and as path-independent. We already showed how ne-graining
and coarse-graining had an eect on the convergence and divergence of a net-
work; hence, one would expect the ne-graining of the outcomes to increase
mutual information and thus path-dependence. With this in mind, we can
conjecture that describing the outcome states at a more detailed grain of
analysis increases the degree of path-dependence:
In a given causal network (O; I;R), if O = fo1; o2; : : : ; ong is ne-
19The technical expression is that mutual information is the expectation, given S, of the
Kullback-Leibler divergence between the distribution p(O) and the conditional distribution
p(OjS):
I(O;S) = ES [DKL(p(ojs)jjp(o)] :
. This is simply a quantitative expression of the how much the conditional probability dis-
tribution is expected to diverge from the unconditional distribution, `from the perspective'
of some time in the past.
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grained to O0 = fo11; : : : ; o1k1 ; o21; : : : ; o2k2 ; : : : ; on1; : : : ; onkng,
then I(O0;S)  I(O;S).
The second line of inquiry would be to investigate how mutual information
changes over time, and how it is aected by symmetry breaking.20 For exam-
ple, an interesting consequence of the nonnegativity of mutual information
is that, through equation (2), the conditional entropy at some intermediary
state is never greater than the unconditional entropy: H(O)  H(OjS). The
entropy H(O) can be thought of as the uncertainty on the distribution of
outcome states without knowing anything about the past (i.e. the diculty
in reconstructing the outcome distribution). In this way the inequality means
that knowing some intermediary state will never increase the uncertainty over
the outcome states.
What is of interest is how the conditional entropy evolves over time
H(OjS). While a analysis in full generality is beyond the scope of this pa-
per, two simple cases can be mentioned. The rst concerns the case where
a network remains symmetric until some intermediate set of states S, after
which the symmetry is broken. From (2) follows that the mutual information
is zero at all intermediary states S before S, and from (2), this means that
H(O) = H(OjS). Thus the conditional entropy remains constant until the
breaking of the symmetry, after which it monotonically decreases. This is
the same result, derived by dierent means, as in theorem 2.
A second simple case is when the network is a causal tree. Here H(O) =
H(OjS0) (since there is only one initial state), and each branching even
creates a sub-tree. Hence H(O) = H(OjS0)  H(OjS1)  H(OjS2) : : : , and
conditional entropy monotonically decreases over time. In a branching tree,
later states always contain more information about the outcome than the
initial states do.
Figure 13: Decrease of
entropy, despite unifor-
mity.
Such a result may seem counterintuitive at rst.
Cannot a network start o with a bias towards some
outcomes, and then evolve towards a uniform dis-
tribution, such as in Figure 13? Would this not in-
crease the conditional entropy? The answer is that
the network does not evolve towards a uniform dis-
tribution over all possible outcomes. The evolution
towards uniformity is outweighed by the fact that
any branch will have some inaccessible outcomes.
Thus, while s0 branches out to four dierent out-
comes, s1 and s2 branch out to only two dierent
20See Sober and Steel (2011) for a related analysis of entropy change in Markov models.
Since causal networks are Markovian, many of their results would also be applicable here.
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outcomes. The entropy of four equiprobable out-
comes is log 4, whereas the entropy of two equiprob-
able outcomes is log 2. In this case, H(OjS) = log 2
and H(OjS0) = 23 log 3 + 13 log 6 > log 2. In this way, entropy also decreases
here over time.
VI. Discussion and conclusion
This article has attempted to give some more formal basis to the concept of
path-dependence, and has argued that this is best done by means of symme-
try considerations in the framework of causal networks. The two alternative
frameworks, attractor landscapes and causal trees, are not only less general
than causal networks, and thus not applicable to a wide range of cases, but
are also mere limiting cases of causal networks. In particular, networks tend
to reduce to trees when the dimensionality of state space is high (in virtue
of less convergence); and to landscapes when the dimensionality is low (in
virtue of more convergence).
Within the causal network framework, symmetry considerations allow for
a both technically and intuitively powerful way of describing path-dependence.
Symmetry comes in dierent scopes | some more global, others more local
| and path-dependence in its most general form arises when global sym-
metry is broken. Local symmetries can be broken for specic states, or at
specic times, and in this way path-dependence is something that can emerge
at a certain point in time. Other interesting phenomena include privileged
states that preserve and states that restore local symmetries (weak global
attractors and exible states).
The degree to which global symmetry is broken or preserved can be quan-
tied by means of mutual information. This measure, which quanties how
much information one variable contributes about another, is perhaps not the
only possible way to quantify path-dependence and historicity; however, it
is conceptually continuous with the qualitative account presented in this pa-
per, and has the added advantage of opening up an information-theoretic
perspective on path-dependence.
As a nal discussion, I would like to suggest some broader philosophical
themes implicit in the symmetry account, in particular, the way in which
historicity is intertwined with causal structure and complexity. The symme-
try formulation of path-dependence states that, as long as a network remains
symmetrical, history does not matter for the eventual outcome. One way in
which this can be rephrased is that, in a symmetrical network, it could very
well be that time did not pass at all, or passed very slowly. The durational
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aspect of time makes no dierence. Prior to the symmetry breaking, the net-
work can be extended or compressed, added to or subtracted from arbitrarily,
without this making any dierence for whatever outcome would eventuate.
If we allow the durational aspect of time to be represented by the quantity
of causal transitions in a network, time only emerges as a relevant physical
quantity when the causal symmetry is broken.
Such considerations oer a novel perspective to Curie's general claim,
\It is dissymmetry that creates the phenomenon"21. While originally formu-
lated in a dierent context and with a dierent notion of symmetry in mind
(see Earman 2004 or Brading and Castellani 2007 for a discussion of this),
in the context of the present paper Curie's claim becomes relevant if one
understands `phenomenon' as `event of historical signicance'. Events are
represented in causal networks by the nodes, from which the vertices branch
out; for these events to count as `phenomena', they must lead to the break-
ing of the symmetry. An analogue in modern physics would be the collapse
of the wave function in the standard interpretation of quantum theory: the
event of observing the spin of the electron causes the possible causal paths to
branch out, and only one path to be realized (either spin up or spin down).22
At some deep level, observability seems to be connected to the breaking of
symmetry.
What is a curious fact is that such causal symmetries are continually bro-
ken in many dynamics in the special sciences (see Longo and Montevil 2012
for the formulation of a similar idea). History matters at every instant. For
example, in biological evolution, with each new evolutionary development,
new constraints are set in place, and the set of possible outcomes is made
smaller. Exceptions are, of course, possible, but seem to be limited to the
global preservation of local symmetries (convergent evolution), or the local
restoration of global symmetry (evolvability). In any case, such exceptions
are rare occurrences in the space of biological possibility; as a rule, most
evolutionary processes are historical and path-dependent.
This observation about biological evolution has been long recognized (see
Beatty 1995); however, a similar conclusion would seem to be applicable to
special sciences in general. This underlines the fact that explanations of the
deductive kind (e.g. D-N explanations) are particularly inadequate when it
comes to the sciences of complex systems, and suggests that path-dependence
is more fundamental to scientic explanation than is currently acknowledged
by the philosophical literature.
21\C'est la dissymetrie qui cree le phenomene." (Curie, 1894, 400).
22Or, if one adheres to the Everettian interpretation, both these paths are realized, but
in dierent parallel universes.
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Why this should be | why some processes are much more historical
than others | is a deep question that can only be posed in this context.
If one considers only the contrast between biology and physics, one factor
that would seem relevant is complexity. In statistical physics, an individual
entity might have only six degrees of freedom (three for position, three for
momentum); in ecology, an individual biological organism has an intractable
number of degrees of freedom. On the microevolutionary scale it is feasible
to abstract away from this multitude of variables and focus only on on a
very limited number of causally relevant variables (i.e., traits). This is one
reason why population genetics can be so elegantly mathematicized.23 By
contrast, on the macroevolutionary scale, such a limitation of state space does
not seem possible, and state space seems to be necessarily high-dimensional
(because potentially every trait can be relevant as environments change).
This fact would go part of the way to explaining why the vast majority of
macroevolutionary processes seem to be unavoidably historical and path-
dependent.
Thus the question as to why historicity emerges in complex systems seems
to be intimately related to the question of why simplicity emerges in complex
systems (Strevens 2006). Some complex systems allow for some degree of
prediction, either through laws or through numerical simulations. Others
do not, and for these systems narrative, historical explanations seem to be
unavoidable, and perhaps are even optimally explanatory.
23Whether the mathematization corresponds to causal reality is a dierent question.
This is related to the debate whether drift and natural selection actually pick out causal
forces in reality, or are just a statistical abstraction from the high-dimensional state space
(see e.g. Matthen 2009 for the relation between abstraction and natural selection).
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Appendix
Theorem 1. A coarse-graining of the explanandum makes an explanation
increasingly convergent and a coarse-graining of the explanans makes an ex-
planantion increasingly divergent. s
Proof. We will prove it for an explanation that is purely parallel, thus neither
convergent nor divergent. The generalization for a random explanation holds
analogously.
Assume a deterministic explanation (O; I; f), so that f is a bijection
f : I ! O. Dene an equivalence relation  on O such that o1  o2 i
o1; o2 2 A for some A (dependent on theoretical interests) with #A > 1.
Because f is a bijection there exists a uniquely dened B 2 I such that
f(B) = A. Call B the `basin' and A the `attractor' of f on I.
Then O=A represents a coarse-graining of the explanandum and I=B a
coarse-graining of the explanans. So dene an associated function Rc : I !
#O=A : i 7! f(i) and relation Rd 2 I=B  O = (f 1(o); o)jo 2 O. Because
f is a bijection, #I = #O > #O=A and #O = #I > #I=B, and hence
Rc will be a non-injective surjection, and Rd a non-function. Hence the
number convergent structures has increased in explanation (O=A; I; Rc), and
the number of divergent structures has increased in (O; I=B;Rd).
Theorem 2. Let (O; I;R) be symmetrical at some instant in time. Then
(O; I;R) is symmetric at all prior instants.
Proof. Assume (O; I;R) is symmetric at time t, corresponding to the set of
intermediate states S. Let S 0 represent some earlier generation of states.
From the local symmetry of (O; I;R) at S we can deduce that P (ojs) = p 2
[0; 1] for all s 2 S.
Take a random predecessor state s0 2 S 0. Assume it branches out to a
number of states s 2 S. Then
P (ojs0) =
X
s
P (ojs)P (sjs0)
= p
X
s
P (sjs0)
= p
since the sum of the probabilities of all paths leaving s0 is 1. Thus the network
is symmetric at S 0.
This also means that the bias p towards outcome o is preserved as long
as the network remains symmetric.
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